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Introduction 
The environmental and social risks of climate change are well known and perhaps inevitable. The 
economic and financial risks are less so. Estimates of the annual costs of climate change have been 
projected from 1-5% of global GDP1; in 2013 US dollars, 1% of world GDP equates to $7.5B2. Such 
economic impacts pose serious risks to global markets, threatening corporate profitability, government 
budgets, and equity markets in both the short and long-term3. The many financial risks associated with 
climate change embedded in endowment portfolio fossil fuel holdings are leading many4 institutional 
stakeholders to enter into dialogue and take action.  Divestment is emerging as an effective strategy for 
limiting portfolio exposure and tackling climate change itself.  
Approaches & Results 
Our team’s goals were to assess whether the Clark endowment portfolio faces any of these risks and 
evaluate the impacts on asset values.  Our findings show that the Clark endowment does face these same 
climate change related portfolio risks where fossil fuel assets are concerned, that those assets represent 
approximately $37.2M or 12.11% of the endowment, and that continued investment fails to prevent 
greater harm or risk to Clark. Our analysis and subsequent recommendations will explain the financial 
risks Clark fossil fuel assets face as well as options to reduce exposure, ensuring the future of the 
endowment and the University. 
The research was done in two phases.  Phase One focused on understanding Clark’s institutional mission 
and values, history of shareholder responsibility, and estimating Clark’s fossil fuel holdings.  This was 
accomplished through interviews with key Clark administrators and staff, literature review, and analysis 
of the Clark endowment portfolio for second quarter, 2014. Notable experiences of Phase One include the 
open engagement and collaboration with staff, and the fiduciary transparency shown by the Clark 
administration.  Phase Two focused on evaluating short and long term risks that Clark fossil fuel assets 
face, research into actions being taken by institutions with similar exposure, and policy options for 
trustees.  Phase Two included further engagement with key administrators, market research, and analysis 
of the Clark endowment for fourth quarter, 2014. 
Clark Endowment- Fossil Fuel Exposure 
One of the principal objectives of the research was to identify the share of Clark’s fossil fuel holdings in 
the investment portfolio. The research team was able to trace 76.3% of the total portfolio to estimate the 
share of the investment in the fossil fuels. Of the traced portfolio, $37.2M or 12.11% is currently invested 
in fossil fuel assets5. These investments are predominantly concentrated in oil and gas companies, refinery 
businesses, drilling equipment and gas exploration.     
                                                          
1 Projections by Nordhaus et al estimate costs at 2% GDP, Tol projects 2% global GDP, standard deviation of 1%,                                                  
per 1 degree increase above pre-industrial levels, while Stern projects 5% per annum. The key difference comes 
from the modeled discount rate chosen by each researcher. Tol 2002, Stern 2006, Nordhaus 2007 
2 World Development indicators database, World Bank, December 2014 
3 Private Equity International, “Clean Energy Investing”, June 2012 
4 For a list of institutions committed to fossil fuel divestment see appendix 6. 
5 Sector holdings derived from publicly available data at NASDAQ (http://www.nasdaq.com/), Bloomberg Business 
Group (http://www.bloomberg.com/) 
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The Convexity Capital Offshore and RS Global Natural Resources are the funds in Clark's portfolio which 
have the biggest concentration of our fossil fuel investments at 85% and 50% respectively. Interestingly, 
these inflation hedging accounts incurred significant losses in the fourth quarter December, 2014, by -11.9% 
and -20.9%, mainly due to the declining oil prices in the market6. The summary of the findings are presented 
in the below table. For detailed analysis and graphs, refer to Appendix 1.  
Figure 1: Clark Fossil Fuel Investment Summary 
 
Risks faced by Clark’s Fossil Fuel Holdings 
Low-Carbon Governance 
Emergent government restrictions on carbon emissions, domestically and globally, may render carbon 
based energy production cost-ineffective, leaving related assets stranded on company balance sheets. 
Governments own 50-70% of worldwide coal, oil, and gas resources, collecting royalties and taxes on the 
rest7.  Thus it is governments, their citizens, and taxpayers that will bear close to 80% of the $25 trillion 
difference in value at risk.  Realization of this burden has catalyzed government action in recent years. 
Domestic Policies  
The Presidential Climate Action Plan includes measures to increase building energy efficiency 20% by 
2020, develop fuel economy standards for heavy-duty vehicles, permit 10 gigawatts of wind and solar 
projects on public lands by 2020, and establish carbon pollution standards for new and existing power 
plants8. More recently the President revised the US target to cut emissions by 26-28% by 2025. If 
successful, each measure will result in reduced demand for fossil fuel energy in US markets.   
In June 2014 the EPA released its proposal to regulate CO2 emissions from existing power plants, the 
111-d rule, with the goal of reducing power plant CO2 emissions 25 % by 20209. The costs of meeting the 
                                                          
6 Clark University Endowment Portfolio Quarter 2 & 4, December 2014 
7 Climate Policy Initiative, “Moving to a Low-Carbon Economy: The Impact of Policy Pathways on Fossil Fuel 
Asset Values,” 2014 
8 Presidential Climate Action Plan  (https://www.whitehouse.gov/climate-change) 
9 Environmental Protection Agency  (http://www.epa.gov/) 
Type of Fund Fund Name
% of Total 
Portfolio
Total Investment
Investment in 
Fossil Fuel
% of Fossil 
Fuels
Dec. Quarter 
Return
Domestic Equity Large Cap Stocks- Adage Capital* 1 9.6% 38,718,678.00$    6,582,175.26$    17.00% 3.9%
Domestic Equity Westfield Capital Mgmt, Small/Mid Cap 8.6% 34,765,408.00$    1,992,057.88$    5.73% 4.0%
Domestic Equity Berkshire Hathaway Inc A Stock 4.7% 18,990,050.00$    827,966.18$       4.36% 9.2%
International Equity Polaris Capital International Value, L.P. 4.6% 18,589,297.00$    1,394,197.28$    7.50% -1.4%
International Equity Wellington Emerging Markets 3.7% 15,044,042.00$    1,513,430.63$    10.06% -3.7%
International Equity City of London Global Emerging Markets 4.2% 17,053,992.00$    1,705,399.20$    10.00% -3.9%
Private Equity Private Equity and Venture Capital 6.2% 25,014,675.00$    2,101,232.70$    8.40% -0.1%
Flexible Capital Farallon Capital Offshore Investors 5.9% 24,056,462.00$    45,707.28$          0.19% -1.4%
Flexible Capital Baupost Value Partners 10.1% 40,859,988.00$    3,187,079.06$    7.80% -0.7%
Inflation Hedging Convexity Capital Offshore J, L.P. *2 1.5% 4,891,019.00$       4,157,366.15$    85.00% -11.9%
Inflation Hedging RS Global Natural Resources Fund Class Y *3 1.9% 7,492,424.00$       3,746,212.00$    50.00% -20.9%
Inflation Hedging Private Real Assets 8.7% 35,239,870.00$    3,574,424.00$    10.14% -0.1%
Fixed Income Oaktree High Yield Accont *4 5.0% 20,354,633.00$    6,106,389.90$    30.00% -1.4%
Flexible Capital Davidson Kempner Institutional Partners, LP *5 1.6% 6,627,970.00$       331,398.50$       5.00% -1.4%
76.3% 307,698,508.00$  37,265,036.01$ 12.11% -2.10%Grand Total
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standards are widely debated, from $5.8 B/yr to $58 B/yr10, with many analysts concluding that coal-fired 
generation will be uneconomical without carbon capture and storage, a technology that has not yet been 
successfully demonstrated. Subsequent cost increase estimates, ranging from 4.1% to 84%, suggest 46-70 
gigawatts of coal plant retirements by 2030, representing 4.7-7% total US electricity production. The 
wide variety of renewable energy and efficiency measures offer alternatives in a rising fossil fuel cost 
environment caused by increased regulation.  
European Union 
The EU has made the largest commitments to a low-carbon economy, targeting a 40% reduction in carbon 
emissions by 2030. This will be accomplished by increasing renewable electricity to 27% of total 
generation, increasing energy efficiency by at least 27%, tightening the EU Emission Trading System’s 
cap 1.4% annually through 2020, then by 2.2% from 2021 onwards. The ambitious targets are legally 
binding for union members11. 
China  
China uses 48.3% of the world’s supply of coal, and 10.7% of the supply of oil. Smog and other 
environmental externalities in urban centers are accelerating the central government’s drive to switch 
energy sources, as demonstrated by the recent announcement that China will increase total installed solar 
capacity 60% by the end of 2015. In November 2014, a US-China joint announcement marked the first 
major commitment by the nation to curb its emissions12. The country will target peak CO2 emissions by 
2030, and increase the non-fossil fuel share of its energy generation to 20% by 2030. These commitments 
signal the impending decline in demand for fossil fuel industry’s largest customer. 
United Nations 
In December, France will host the 2015 UN Conference of the Parties (COP), where the aim is the 
adoption of an international climate change agreement that will set the transition towards low-carbon 
economies for its members. The annual COP has become the largest international negotiation platform in 
human history, with all 193 member states participating in the negotiations annually. Forty-two developed 
countries have communicated targets under the convention after the 2014 COP in Copenhagen13. The goal 
of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is to have legally binding emission 
reduction targets for all of its members. The UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
comprises the world’s foremost experts and scientists spanning all disciplines.  Various IPCC working 
groups have concluded that a 2 °C temperature increase limit be met to avoid catastrophic consequences, 
and that binding CO2 emission targets be set to avoid the limit.  An international climate deal would mean 
that fossil fuel markets would be limited world-wide, seriously devaluing projected capitalization of 
reserves. 
 
Demand Risks by Commodity 
The shift to a low-carbon economy is likely to be disruptive for market valuations. Traditionally long-
term carbon emission targets have not been considered when evaluating assets, creating an over-
investment in fossil fuels.  Financial institutions such as HSBC have begun analyzing the effects the shift 
                                                          
10 American Coalition for Clean Coal Electricity, “Survey of Clean Power Plan Impact Studies,” Feb 2015 
11 European Union, 2030 framework for climate and energy policies, 
(http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/2030/index_en.htm) 
12 White House Press Release, Nov 11, 2014  (http://wh.gov/ixRtO) 
13 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 2015  (http://unfccc.int/2860.php) 
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to a low-carbon economy will have, estimating that 40 to 60 % of coal, oil, and gas valuations are at 
risk14. 
Thermal Coal 
Key findings show that future demand and price levels for thermal coal may fall short of industry 
expectations15. Coal accounts for approximately 80% of the emission reduction target in the International 
Energy Agency’s (IEA) low-carbon scenario16. Coal industry's asset valuations are compromised by 
greater energy efficiency, cheaper alternatives, and emerging pollution regulation domestically and 
internationally. With demand falling in OECD17 member countries and peak demand in China imminent, 
oversupply of the market will further weaken asset values. High production costs related to exploration 
and extraction deem additional capital expenditures risky, especially for unexploited reserves. 
The downward trend of coal is already evident in the Bloomberg Global Coal Equity Index which has lost 
half of its value over the last three years despite a 30% increase in broad market indices such as MSCI18. 
Retail coal prices, returns, and share prices are each down, signifying a structural decline in the thermal 
coal market. Zack’s Industry Ranking put the coal industry at 232 out of 259 in its industry classification 
on July 201319, far below the acceptable ranking of 169, denoting a significant negative outlook for 
investors.  
The discouraging economics of coal have led investors to diversify geographically into emerging 
"seaborne" markets, however in a low-demand scenario these chronically oversupplied markets chase a 
demand that is likely to remain stagnant well below industry expectations. This is an important 
implication for international equities, such as those in Clark’s portfolio, which will likely increase 
exposure as investment shifts away from domestic equity. 
Crude Oil 
In the IEA’s low-carbon scenario, oil accounts for close to 75% of the fossil fuel asset value at risk in the 
low-carbon transition. This is largely due to crude oil’s increasingly high marginal production costs and 
high profit margins. Demand for oil is affected by a range of factors which includes supply costs, 
technological advances, air quality standards and carbon regulation. An estimated $1.1 trillion has been 
earmarked by companies large and small for high cost oil projects, requiring a market price of over $95 a 
barrel through 202520. Exposure to unconventional sources such as deepwater, Arctic, shale oil, and oil 
sands faces immediate risks. The recent drop in oil prices, to as low as $47 a barrel,21 is causing these 
high cost ventures to operate at a significant loss. The current approach of most major companies is to 
replace reserves at any cost, leaving them exposed to price shifts for the sake of volume and not value. In 
the face of such price volatility and decreasing demand, the ability of large companies to maintain both 
capital expenditure and dividends is being questioned, signaling reduced profitability for investors.  
                                                          
14 International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), “Integrating Environmental Risks into Asset 
Valuations: The potential for stranded assets and the implications for long-term investors,” 
15 Carbon Tracker Initiative (CTI), “Carbon supply cost curves: Evaluating financial risk to coal capital 
expenditures,” September 2014 
16 U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), “EIA Annual Energy Outlook 2014 with projections to 2040,” 
April 2014 
17 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
18 MSCI World is a stock market index of 1612 “world stocks.” It is maintained by MSCI Inc., formally Morgan 
Stanley Capital International, and is used as a common benchmark for world or global stock funds. 
19 Zack’s Research Industry Rank  (http://www.zacks.com/stocks/industry-rank)  
20 CTI, “Carbon supply cost curves: Evaluating financial risk to oil capital expenditures,” May 2014 
21 Bloomberg WTI & Brent price projections, see Appendix 2 
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Natural Gas 
The application of hydraulic fracturing techniques to natural gas extraction and the subsequent increase in 
supply, has driven the recent shift in US electrical generating capacity since 201022. The "fracking" 
revolution has brought a period of inexpensive natural gas domestically, however gas export terminals 
will soon come on line in 2015 and 2016, fueling international demand and driving prices back up. 
Natural gas investors look forward to the imminent entrance into international markets, but this supply 
source is a product of techniques with a questionable future. The injection of proppants and other toxic 
chemicals into the shale along with millions of gallons of water may have unintended environmental 
consequences23. Methane emitted into the atmosphere is another side effect of natural gas extraction that 
is gaining attention due to methane’s potency as a greenhouse gas.  
Advances in Renewable Energy 
Advances in alternative energy reduce demand for coal, oil, and gas. Such shifts in demand will devalue 
fossil fuel assets, damaging asset holders.  Resource-based fuels such as coal and oil inevitably face rising 
supply costs, whereas innovation-based fuels such as renewables will soon meet price parity with the 
incumbent regime and fall beyond24. There are signs that this is already happening. Biomass, hydropower, 
geothermal, and onshore wind are already competitive with or cheaper than coal, oil and gas-fired power 
plants, even without financial support and despite falling oil prices. Solar photovoltaics are leading the 
cost decline, with solar PV module costs falling 75% since the end of 2009 and the cost of electricity from 
utility scale projects falling 50% since 2010. (See Appendix 4) 
In 2015 alone, electric generating companies intend to add more than 20 gigawatts (GW) of utility-scale 
generating capacity to the power grid, 76% of which is non-fossil fuel based.  This is to offset the 14GW 
of generating capacity that is expected to retire in 2015, 81% of which is coal-fired generation25. These 
values reflect reported additions and retirements, not projections. The large number of coal-fired plant 
retirements are primarily due to the implementation of the EPA’s Mercury and Air Toxics Standards 
regulations this year.    
Penetration of no-carbon generation has increased by 12% in recent years in Europe, as European Union 
countries work toward renewable energy and greenhouse gas emission targets26. France, Iceland, Norway, 
Sweden, and Switzerland each generated more than 90% of their net electricity from no carbon sources in 
2012, and eight other countries had no-carbon electricity accounting for at least 50% of their generation. 
  
Fossil Fuel Price Volatility 
According to the historical oil price data generated from the Bloomberg terminal, oil prices have been 
subject to substantial fluctuations during the years 2008-2015. For instance, during year 2009, oil prices 
dropped by an average of 37%. The year 2015 has also been highly volatile as the market prices for crude 
oil fell by 41% from the previous year. Oil prices have continued to be highly volatile for at least the last 
                                                          
22 Jacquelyn Pless, National Conference of State Legislatures, “Natural Gas Development and Hydraulic 
Fracturing,” June 2012 
23 Natural Resource Defense Council, “Unchecked Fracking Threatens health, Water Supplies,” 2014 
24 International Renewable Energy Agency,  “Renewable Power Generation Costs report,” January 2015 
25 EIA, “Scheduled electricity generation capacity additions and retirements in 2015,” Mar 2015 
26 EIA, “European nations are increasing electricity generation using no-carbon sources,” September 2014 
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four decades27. For instance, the global recession in 1974-1975 was triggered by the tripling of the oil prices 
following the oil embargo. During 1990-1991, US recession was partly caused by the spike in the oil prices 
after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. There was also a sharp increase in the oil prices during 2001 following the 
California energy crisis and the political tensions in the Middle East.  
The current West Texas Instrument price index (WTI) is $48.38 with a one year high and low of $98.87-
$44.03. According to the Bloomberg forecast, the oil prices will remain within the range $60-$77 for next 
five years. The following graph highlights the major deviations in the oil prices during 2008-2015. For 
detailed analysis, including price projects through 2021, please refer to Appendix 2.  
Figure 2: Oil Price Fluctuations 2008-2015 
 
Stranded Assets 
“Stranded Assets” is a phenomenon that has recently come to the forefront of the climate change 
discussion. In order to prevent a rise in global temperature of 2°C, certain assets such as coal, oil fields, 
and shale gas will be unburnable; that is, companies will be unable to capitalize on resource reserves due 
to emission limits28. Current estimated global fossil fuel reserves represent 2,795 gigatons of CO2 
(GtCO2), of that only 884 GtCO2 worth can be burned until 205029. Stranded assets include both resource 
and physical assets, such as power plants, extraction equipment and other related technologies. Stranding 
goes beyond an asset simply ceasing to operate; it is also considered a loss of value due to changes in 
policy, market, technology and social conditions. Asset stranding can also degrade a company’s ability to 
secure financing for new investments.  In the face of stranding, companies will seek capital to retool 
equipment and adapt operations to new regulatory and market demands, however losses in equity will 
create a negative outlook by the financial system. Clark’s fossil fuel holdings are at risk as such changes 
take place during the shift to a low-carbon economy.  
 
                                                          
27 Roubini, Setser, “The effects of the recent oil price shock on the U.S. and global economy,” August 2004  
28 Climate Policy Initiative, “Moving to a low-carbon economy: The impact of policy pathways on fossil fuel asset 
values,” October 2014 
29 University of Oxford, “Stranded assets and the fossil fuel divestment campaign: what does divestment mean for 
the valuation of fossil fuel assets,” 2014 
8 
 
Three things must occur for an individual, business, or government to face asset stranding. 
The investor must own or rely on the output of an asset or resource for future profits. 
The value of the asset or resource must change, because the price for the output changes or 
because the output is no longer needed. 
The change in value must not be reflected in current asset valuations. 
For Clark fossil fuel holdings, the first and third asset characteristics clearly apply.  Although UN climate 
negotiations for a carbon budget are underway, nothing legally binding has been passed, thus stranding 
risk is not reflected in current valuations. Concerning the second characteristic, it is true that prices for 
fossil fuel outputs have recently dropped, but it is not the case that the outputs are no longer needed.  
However, this is changing. As discussed in preceding sections, innovations in renewable energy 
technologies and energy efficiency measures are being commercialized on a wider scale, reducing the 
need for fossil fuels and related technologies. In addition, various policies that suppress demand are being 
implemented at all levels, increasing Clark’s stranded asset risk. 
 
Carbon Risk Valuation Tool 
The Bloomberg Carbon Risk Valuation Tool (CRVT) is a recently developed financial model that assesses 
the impact of price fluctuations and stranded asset risk on the share price and earnings of fossil fuel 
companies. The widely agreed upon 2°C temperature increase limit may turn two-thirds of global fossil 
fuel reserves into stranded assets, an assumption that is built into the Bloomberg model.  
Achieving the 2°C limit would require a reduction of global CO2 emissions to a cumulative total of 884 
GtCO2 until 2050 from a total of 2795 GtCO2 based on the current level of proven fossil fuel reserves30. 
This will cause 1,911 GtCO2 worth of fossil fuel reserves to become unmarketable if we are to meet our 
carbon budget. 
Considering the assumption that earnings will decrease by 80% starting from year 2020 until 2035 due to 
prompt de-carbonization and that 80% of the fossil fuel reserves will stay in ground as per the Bloomberg 
standard assumption31, we have analyzed the share price of the top five US companies in terms of market 
capitalization with and without the stranded asset effect. The summary of the analysis is presented in the 
below table. According to the CRVT model and the assumptions mentioned above, the companies’ share 
price will drop by on average by 68%. A detailed analysis is provided in Appendix 3.  
Figure 3: Share Price Analysis of Five Major Oil Companies  
 
 
                                                          
30 UNFCCC, concluding agreement, 2009  (www.unfccc.int/meetings/copenhagen_dec_2009/meetings/6295.php) 
31 CTI has concluded that two-thirds of fossil fuel assets will become stranded, however the Bloomberg CRVT 
model assumes 80% will become stranded.  We attribute this difference to variation in the methodology of the two 
sources. 
Price/Company Exxon Mobil Corp Chevron Corp ConocoPhillips Occidental Petroleum Corp EOG Resources Inc
Current Share Price 83.76$                          104.32$                62.91$                     72.89$                                              90.48$                            
Estimated w/out Stranded 58.69$                          36.48$                  34.08$                     37.58$                                              23.59$                            
Change -30% -65% -46% -48% -74%
Estimate w/ Stranding 41.07$                          14.15$                  19.44$                     36.67$                                              14.29$                            
Change -51% -86% -69% -50% -84%
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Clark University holds investments in all five companies through multiple intermediaries. Adage Capital 
manages 9.6% of the Clark endowment; Adage has $3.6 billion directly invested in ExxonMobil, and $2.3 
billion directly invested in Chevron Corp32. Clark has invested 4.7% of its endowment in Berkshire 
Hathaway Inc. A stock, which holds Vanguard Group Inc., Bank of New York Mellon Corp, and State 
Street Capital in its top 25 holdings.  The latter three companies appear as the top 10 institutional holders 
for all five fossil fuel companies under examination, often appearing in the top 3 positions. Although 
these are Clark’s clearest connections to these companies, they are certainly not the only.  
Conclusion 
Our findings show that the Clark endowment faces climate change related portfolio risks where fossil fuel 
assets are concerned, and that continued investment fails to prevent greater harm or risk to Clark. The 
emerging risks associated with fossil fuel assets jeopardize the financial position of those investors caught 
unaware. Investors can choose to be beneficiaries of the emerging low-carbon economy but must realize 
that fossil fuel assets are quickly becoming unacceptably high in risk, with recovery unlikely due to 
shifting landscapes.  Investors will need to take anticipatory action to divert capital from high risk areas 
before the carbon bubble bursts.  
Fiduciaries for endowments of universities, foundations, or other institutions are charged with the ‘duty of 
care’33. The American Law Institute’s (ALI) 1991 Restatement of Trusts, Third, Section 227 states: 
"This standard requires the exercise of reasonable care, skill and caution, and is applied to 
investments not in isolation but in the context of the ...portfolio and as a part of an overall 
investment strategy, which should incorporate risk and return objectives reasonably suitable to 
the [purposes of the endowment]". 
The ALI Introduction states that "The rules ... are intended to reflect the lessons derived from modern 
experience and research, without either endorsing or excluding any particular theories of economics or 
investment."  
 
The primary mandate of the Clark University endowment is to ensure institutional longevity 
through the creation of financial returns, however the extent to which this goal is achieved 
sustainably is at Trustee discretion.  At Clark, Trustees are directed to “assure maximum income 
while preserving the safety of the endowment; and, assure that investment policies reflect a 
concern for the mission and principles of the university34.” Although compliance with the latter 
directive is notably important, it falls outside the scope of this brief, as do other considerations 
we uncovered during our research, see Appendix 7. Recommended policies focus on ensuring 
the long-term safety of the endowment by reducing exposure to increasingly high risk fossil fuel 
assets.   
                                                          
32 NASDAQ terminal 2015 
33 Longstreth, “The Financial Case for Divestment of Fossil Fuel Companies by Endowment Fiduciaries,” 2014 
34 Clark University Board of Trustees Shareholder Responsibility Committee Guidelines and Procedures for Review 
of Shareholder Issues, 2005 
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Recommendations  
We recommend that the Clark University Board of Trustees consider adopting a fossil fuel free 
investment policy on the principal that fossil fuel investments present unacceptably high risk given the 
shifting economic and political landscape. The implementation of which may take on a two phased 
approach with six stages: 
Phase 1.  
Formation of a sub-committee tasked with researching alternative investment strategies for the University 
endowment and engaging with institutional partners. 
Negotiate with direct investment partners through proxy voting and shareholder resolution where 
reasonable business alternatives exist. Request that fund managers divert capital investments from 
financial packages diversified with fossil fuels to fossil free products. If institutional partners are unable 
to offer fossil free portfolios, plan for reinvestment when current investment contracts expire. 
Identify low volume commodities in the portfolio, such as coal, and divest immediately. 
Phase 2.  
Practice impact investing through support of regional clean energy projects, i.e. solar partnerships. 
Adoption of negative screening policy when evaluating future investments, foregoing investment in Fossil 
Free Indexes’ top 200 fossil fuel companies. This index's rankings are based on calculated carbon 
emissions data using reserves reported as of Oct 31, 2014 (see Appendix 5). 
Adoption of a positive screening policy with an Environmental Social Governance (ESG) and Socially 
Responsible Investing (SRI) criteria. Performance of such portfolios have proven to yield similar and 
better returns than traditional fossil fuel diversified portfolios, see Appendix 8 for a detailed analysis by 
Edward Snook Jr., dual-degree MBA/MS ES&P candidate, 2016. 
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Appendix 1  
 
Exhibit 1.1- Summary of Clark’s Investment Portfolio 
 
 
 
Exhibit 1.2- Portfolio Composition by Type of Fund 
 
 
 
 
 
Summary of Total Investments
Type of Funds Market Value % of Portfolio 10 Yr Return
Total Fund 404,420,179.0$    100.0% 10.1%
Domestic Equity 92,474,136.0$      22.9% 10.4%
International Equity 84,961,765.0$      21.0% 12.0%
Private Equity and Venture Capital 25,014,675.0$      6.2% 15.7%
Flexible Capital 126,822,076.0$    31.4% 9.3%
Inflation Hedging 48,623,314.0$      12.0% 7.2%
Fixed Income 25,616,809.0$      6.3% 8.1%
Other- Unmanaged Assets 889,404.0$            0.2% 0.0%
23%
21%
6%
32%
12%
6% 0%
Domestic Equity
International Equity
Private Equity and Venture
Capital
Flexible Capital
Inflation Hedging
Fixed Income
Other- Unmanaged Assets
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Exhibit 1.3- Endowment Performance (in millions $) 
             
 
Exhibit 1.4- Segment Level Performance (% rate of return) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Year
 Ending 
Market Value 
1996 75.90$               
1997 107.60$            
1998 111.70$            
1999 149.00$            
2000 160.20$            
2001 158.00$            
2002 152.30$            
2003 182.60$            
2004 206.80$            
2005 215.00$            
2006 265.20$            
2007 295.60$            
2008 223.80$            
2009 253.80$            
2010 300.80$            
2011 293.80$            
2012 337.80$            
2013 389.70$            
2014 403.50$            
 $-
 $50.00
 $100.00
 $150.00
 $200.00
 $250.00
 $300.00
 $350.00
 $400.00
 $450.00
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
Ending Market Value
Type of Funds
1 Year 
Return
1 Year 
Index 
Return
5 Years 
Return
5 Years 
Index 
Return
10 Year 
Return
10 Year 
Index 
Return
Total Fund 18.2% 15.8% 15.0% 11.7% 10.1% 8.0%
Domestic Equity 25.1% 25.2% 21.5% 19.3% 10.4% 8.2%
International Equity 22.4% 21.8% 15.2% 11.1% 12.0% 7.7%
Private Equity and Venture Capital 25.8% 24.6% 18.4% 18.8% 15.7% 7.8%
Flexible Capital 15.7% 9.0% 13.3% 6.5% 9.3% 7.8%
Inflation Hedging 8.6% 11.2% 7.9% 9.7% 7.2% 8.6%
Fixed Income 8.5% 7.8% 11.0% 9.8% 8.1% 7.1%
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Exhibit 1.5- Comparison of 10-Year returns with Index Returns by Type of Funds 
 
 
Exhibit 1.6- Estimated Fossil Fuel Holdings of Clark 
 
Type of Fund Fund Name
% of Total 
Portfolio
Total Investment
Investment in 
Fossil Fuel
% of Fossil 
Fuels
Dec. Quarter 
Return
Domestic Equity Large Cap Stocks- Adage Capital* 1 9.6% 38,718,678.00$    6,582,175.26$    17.00% 3.9%
Domestic Equity Westfield Capital Mgmt, Small/Mid Cap 8.6% 34,765,408.00$    1,992,057.88$    5.73% 4.0%
Domestic Equity Berkshire Hathaway Inc A Stock 4.7% 18,990,050.00$    827,966.18$       4.36% 9.2%
International Equity Polaris Capital International Value, L.P. 4.6% 18,589,297.00$    1,394,197.28$    7.50% -1.4%
International Equity Wellington Emerging Markets 3.7% 15,044,042.00$    1,513,430.63$    10.06% -3.7%
International Equity City of London Global Emerging Markets 4.2% 17,053,992.00$    1,705,399.20$    10.00% -3.9%
Private Equity Private Equity and Venture Capital 6.2% 25,014,675.00$    2,101,232.70$    8.40% -0.1%
Flexible Capital Farallon Capital Offshore Investors 5.9% 24,056,462.00$    45,707.28$          0.19% -1.4%
Flexible Capital Baupost Value Partners 10.1% 40,859,988.00$    3,187,079.06$    7.80% -0.7%
Inflation Hedging Convexity Capital Offshore J, L.P. *2 1.5% 4,891,019.00$       4,157,366.15$    85.00% -11.9%
Inflation Hedging RS Global Natural Resources Fund Class Y *3 1.9% 7,492,424.00$       3,746,212.00$    50.00% -20.9%
Inflation Hedging Private Real Assets 8.7% 35,239,870.00$    3,574,424.00$    10.14% -0.1%
Fixed Income Oaktree High Yield Accont *4 5.0% 20,354,633.00$    6,106,389.90$    30.00% -1.4%
Flexible Capital Davidson Kempner Institutional Partners, LP *5 1.6% 6,627,970.00$       331,398.50$       5.00% -1.4%
76.3% 307,698,508.00$  37,265,036.01$ 12.11% -2.10%
*1  Dec. Report P. 45
*2 Source: Jim Collins
*3 Source: Jim Collins
*4 Source: Jim Collins
*5  Dec. Report P. 50
Grand Total
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Exhibit 1.7- Fossil Fuel Investment by Major Funds 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 2 
 
Exhibit 2.1- Historical Oil Price Analysis Oil Price Analysis
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Cal % Chan
2008 93.1 95.3 105.4 112.5 125.5 134.0 133.5 116.7 103.8 76.7 57.4 42.0 98.5 124.8 116.9 57.5 99.4 0%
2009 41.9 39.3 48.1 49.9 59.2 69.7 64.3 71.1 69.5 75.8 78.1 74.6 43.5 60.4 68.4 76.0 62.3 -37%
2010 78.4 76.5 81.3 84.6 74.1 75.4 76.4 76.7 75.5 82.0 84.3 89.2 78.9 77.8 76.1 85.5 79.6 28%
2011 89.6 89.7 103.0 110.0 101.4 96.3 97.3 86.3 85.6 86.4 97.2 98.6 94.8 102.1 89.4 94.4 95.2 20%
2012 100.3 102.3 106.2 103.3 94.7 82.4 87.9 94.2 94.6 89.6 86.7 88.2 103.2 92.6 92.4 88.2 94.1 -1%
2013 94.8 95.3 93.0 92.1 94.8 95.8 104.7 106.5 106.2 100.6 93.9 97.9 94.3 94.3 105.9 97.5 98.0 4%
2014 94.9 100.7 100.5 102.0 101.8 105.1 102.4 96.1 93.0 84.3 75.8 59.3 98.8 103.2 96.8 72.1 92.7 -5%
2015 47.3 50.7 50.4 52.3 53.6 54.7 55.8 56.6 57.2 57.9 58.4 58.9 49.5 53.6 56.6 58.4 54.6 -41%
2016 59.3 59.7 60.1 60.4 60.7 60.9 61.2 61.4 61.7 61.9 62.1 62.3 59.7 60.7 61.4 62.1 61.0 12%
2017 62.5 62.6 62.9 63.1 63.3 63.4 63.6 63.8 64.0 64.2 64.4 64.5 62.7 63.3 63.8 64.4 63.5 4%
2018 64.6 64.7 64.8 65.0 65.1 65.2 65.3 65.4 65.6 65.7 65.9 65.9 64.7 65.1 65.4 65.9 65.3 3%
2019 66.0 66.1 66.2 66.3 66.4 66.4 66.6 66.7 66.9 67.1 67.2 67.3 66.1 66.4 66.7 67.2 66.6 2%
2020 67.4 67.5 67.6 67.7 67.8 67.9 68.0 68.1 68.2 68.4 68.5 68.5 67.5 67.8 68.1 68.5 68.0 2%
2021 68.6
Average 73.5 74.6 77.6 79.2 79.1 79.8 80.5 79.2 77.8 75.4 73.8 72.1 75.5 79.4 79.1 73.7 76.9 -1%
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Cal % Chan
2008 92.0 94.7 102.9 110.4 124.7 133.7 134.6 115.2 100.8 73.7 54.7 43.1 97.0 123.8 115.6 56.1 98.1 0%
2009 45.7 43.9 47.4 51.4 58.6 69.3 65.8 73.1 68.1 73.9 77.6 75.2 45.8 60.5 68.9 75.5 62.9 -36%
2010 77.0 74.8 79.9 85.8 77.0 75.7 75.4 77.1 78.4 83.5 86.2 92.3 77.5 79.2 77.1 87.7 80.3 28%
2011 96.9 104.0 114.7 123.1 114.5 113.9 116.8 109.9 109.9 108.8 110.5 107.7 105.9 116.9 112.0 108.9 110.9 38%
2012 111.5 119.1 124.5 120.5 110.3 95.9 102.7 112.7 113.0 111.5 109.5 109.2 118.8 107.9 109.8 110.0 111.6 1%
2013 112.3 116.1 109.5 103.4 103.3 103.3 107.4 110.4 111.3 109.4 107.9 110.7 112.4 103.3 109.8 109.5 108.8 -3%
2014 107.1 108.8 107.7 108.1 109.2 112.0 108.2 103.4 98.6 88.0 79.6 63.3 107.9 109.9 103.0 75.9 99.2 -9%
2015 49.8 58.8 60.1 60.3 61.1 61.9 62.7 63.4 64.0 64.6 65.0 65.4 56.5 61.2 63.4 65.1 61.6 -38%
2016 65.9 66.5 66.8 67.1 67.5 67.9 68.2 68.5 68.7 69.0 69.2 69.5 66.4 67.5 68.5 69.2 67.9 10%
2017 69.7 70.0 70.2 70.3 70.5 70.7 70.8 71.0 71.1 71.3 71.5 71.6 70.0 70.5 71.0 71.5 70.7 4%
2018 71.8 72.0 72.1 72.3 72.4 72.6 72.7 72.8 73.0 73.1 73.3 73.5 72.0 72.4 72.9 73.3 72.6 3%
2019 73.7 73.9 74.1 74.3 74.4 74.5 74.6 74.6 74.7 74.8 75.0 75.1 73.9 74.4 74.6 75.0 74.5 3%
2020 75.3 75.4 75.6 75.7 75.9 76.0 76.2 76.3 76.5 76.6 76.8 76.9 75.4 75.9 76.3 76.8 76.1 2%
2021 77.0
Average 80.4 82.9 85.0 86.4 86.1 86.7 87.4 86.8 85.2 82.9 81.3 79.5 83.0 86.4 86.4 81.1 84.3 0%
Source: Bloomberg
WTI [USD/bbl]
Brent [USD/bbl]
Exhibit 2.2- WTI and Brent Crude Oil Prices (2008-2020) 
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Appendix 3 
 
Exhibit 3.1- Carbon Risk Valuation Tool Analysis- Risk Assessment of Top 5 Fossil Fuel Companies  
 
Exxon Mobil Corp
Current Consensus Model w/Stranding
Share Price 83.76$    93.83$         58.69$    41.07$            
  Price change 12% -30% -51%
EV/EBIT 17.09 17.09 8.84 6.48
P/E 15.23 15.23 10.68 7.47
Chevron Corp
Current Consensus Model w/Stranding
Share Price 104.32$  112.63$       36.48$    14.15$            
  Price change 8% -65% -86%
EV/EBIT 31.91 31.91 8.01 4.02
P/E 15.71 15.71 5.49 2.13
ConocoPhillips
Current Consensus Model w/Stranding
Share Price 62.91$    72.71$         34.08$    19.44$            
  Price change 16% -46% -69%
EV/EBIT 55.26 55.26 27.52 19.23
P/E 19.68 19.68 10.66 6.08
Occidental Petroleum Corp
Current Consensus Model w/Stranding
Share Price 72.89$    85.00$         37.58$    36.67$            
  Price change 17% -48% -50%
EV/EBIT 44.71 44.71 13.04 12.76
P/E 21.76 21.76 11.22 10.94
EOG Resources Inc
Current Consensus Model w/Stranding
Share Price 90.48$    100.44$       23.59$    14.29$            
  Price change 11% -74% -84%
EV/EBIT 72.79 72.82 21.92 15.25
P/E 43.66 43.68 11.38 6.90
Appendix 4 
 
Exhibit 4.1- 2015 Changes in US Generation Capacity 
 
 
Exhibit 4.2- Levelized Cost of Electricity from Utility Scale Projects 
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Appendix 5 
 
Exhibit 5.1- Fossil Fuel Index’s Top 200 (Year 2015) 
Rank Coal Companies 
Coal 
Gt 
CO2 Rank Oil and Gas Companies 
Oil  
Gt 
CO2 
Gas  
Gt 
CO2 
Total 
O&G 
Gt 
CO2 
1 Coal India 57.722 1 Gazprom 6.749 37.166 43.915 
2 China Shenhua 36.807 2 Rosneft 10.666 2.558 13.224 
3 Adani 25.383 3 PetroChina 4.790 3.801 8.591 
4 Shanxi Coking 18.445 4 ExxonMobil 4.307 3.916 8.223 
5 Anglo American 13.488 5 Lukoil 5.699 1.288 6.988 
6 BHP Billiton 12.351 6 BP 4.214 2.506 6.719 
7 Yitai Coal 12.223 7 Petrobras 4.707 0.724 5.432 
8 Datang Intl 12.206 8 Royal Dutch Shell 2.229 2.315 4.544 
9 China Coal 12.103 9 Chevron 2.485 1.588 4.073 
10 Peabody Energy 11.484 10 Novatek 0.497 3.356 3.853 
11 Glencore Xstrata 10.698 11 Total 2.002 1.800 3.802 
12 Datong Coal 10.281 12 ConocoPhillips 1.687 1.111 2.798 
13 Yanzhou Coal 9.788 13 Tatneft 2.556 0.064 2.620 
14 DEH 9.339 14 ONGC 1.594 0.862 2.457 
15 Exxaro 8.793 15 ENI 1.366 0.990 2.356 
16 Yangquan Coal 7.298 16 Statoil  0.981 1.004 1.985 
17 Mechel 6.739 17 Sinopec 1.340 0.381 1.722 
18 Arch Coal 6.513 18 CNOOC  1.175 0.373 1.548 
19 Alpha Natural Resources 5.458 19 Occidental 1.024 0.303 1.327 
20 EVRAZ 4.855 20 BG Group 0.533 0.588 1.122 
21 Mitsubishi 4.738 21 Canadian Natural Resources  0.788 0.208 0.995 
22 Vale 4.401 22 Anadarko Petroleum  0.482 0.502 0.984 
23 Raspadskaya 4.084 23 Apache  0.569 0.400 0.969 
24 Rio Tinto 3.696 24 Chesapeake Energy  0.269 0.639 0.909 
25 Asia Resource 3.181 25 Inpex  0.541 0.367 0.908 
26 Rusal 3.081 26 Bashneft 0.892 0.000 0.892 
27 Neyveli Lignite 3.035 27 Devon Energy  0.381 0.507 0.889 
28 Pingdingshan 3.023 28 BHP Billiton 0.333 0.521 0.854 
29 Cloud Peak 2.753 29 Repsol 0.271 0.551 0.823 
30 Sasol 2.731 30 Ecopetrol 0.607 0.167 0.774 
31 Tata Steel 2.709 31 EOG Resources 0.497 0.275 0.772 
32 AGL 2.704 32 Suncor Energy  0.713 0.003 0.715 
33 Teck 2.603 33 Marathon Oil  0.538 0.146 0.683 
34 Severstal 2.577 34 Hess  0.457 0.108 0.565 
35 Coalspur 2.545 35 Imperial Oil  0.527 0.025 0.552 
36 Kuzbass Fuel  2.504 36 Encana  0.081 0.467 0.548 
37 Polyus Gold 2.294 37 Noble Energy 0.173 0.318 0.490 
38 Energy Ventures 2.184 38 BASF 0.134 0.348 0.483 
39 Whitehaven Coal 2.055 39 EQT  0.037 0.412 0.449 
40 Banpu 2.040 40 Range Resources  0.134 0.309 0.443 
41 Bayan 1.957 41 Continental Resources 0.312 0.113 0.426 
42 RWE 1.943 42 OMV 0.269 0.151 0.420 
43 Consol Energy 1.887 43 Antero Resources 0.042 0.368 0.410 
44 WHSP 1.851 44 KazMunaiGas EP 0.382 0.018 0.400 
45 Westmoreland 1.835 45 YPF  0.250 0.139 0.389 
46 Resource Generation 1.818 46 Southwestern Energy  0.000 0.380 0.380 
47 Churchill Mining 1.745 47 Cenovus Energy  0.326 0.048 0.374 
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48 NTPC 1.740 48 Linn Energy 0.199 0.164 0.364 
49 Adaro 1.607 49 Woodside Petroleum 0.049 0.311 0.360 
50 Nacco 1.557 50 Husky Energy  0.215 0.128 0.343 
51 Idemitsu Kosan 1.530 51 PTT  0.106 0.211 0.317 
52 ARLP 1.468 52 Consol Energy  0.000 0.312 0.312 
53 Huolinhe Opencut 1.387 53 Pioneer Natural Resources  0.198 0.104 0.302 
54 Golden Energy 1.354 54 Cabot Oil & Gas  0.011 0.289 0.300 
55 Mitsui & Co 1.344 55 WPX Energy 0.072 0.203 0.275 
56 CoAL 1.339 56 SK Innovation  0.263 0.000 0.263 
57 NLMK 1.288 57 Whiting Petroleum  0.219 0.025 0.244 
58 Tata Power 1.062 58 Murphy Oil  0.179 0.063 0.242 
59 MMK OJSC 1.046 59 QEP Resources  0.094 0.139 0.233 
60 Wesfarmers 1.011 60 Newfield Exploration  0.134 0.090 0.223 
61 Kazakhmys 0.998 61 Dragon Oil 0.159 0.043 0.202 
62 New World Resources 0.972 62 Sasol  0.115 0.085 0.201 
63 MMC 0.903 63 Ultra Petroleum  0.014 0.186 0.200 
64 Itochu 0.878 64 Santos 0.027 0.167 0.195 
65 Cockatoo 0.800 65 Concho Resources  0.130 0.064 0.194 
66 Shanxi Meijin Energy 0.784 66 Denbury Resources  0.164 0.027 0.190 
67 Jizhong Energy 0.742 67 Freeport-McMoRan 0.152 0.031 0.183 
68 Bandanna 0.731 68 Maersk Group 0.174 0.000 0.174 
69 Polo Resources 0.726 69 MEG Energy  0.173 0.000 0.173 
70 Allete 0.723 70 SandRidge Energy 0.081 0.076 0.157 
71 CLP Holdings 0.696 71 Crescent Point Energy  0.146 0.011 0.157 
72 Aspire 0.670 72 GDF SUEZ 0.044 0.111 0.155 
73 Marubeni 0.568 73 Pacific Rubiales Energy  0.124 0.030 0.154 
74 China Resources 0.567 74 SM Energy  0.084 0.065 0.148 
75 Walter Energy 0.556 75 JX Holdings  0.146 0.000 0.146 
76 Coal Energy 0.503 76 Cimarex Energy  0.074 0.070 0.144 
77 Indika 0.485 77 Mitsui & Co  0.048 0.095 0.142 
78 Arcelor Mittal 0.464 78 Penn West Petroleum  0.100 0.036 0.137 
79 FirstEnergy 0.458 79 Polish Oil & Gas 0.033 0.100 0.132 
80 Black Hills 0.431 80 MOL 0.076 0.055 0.131 
81 Wescoal 0.430 81 Energen  0.088 0.039 0.128 
82 Grupo Mexico 0.420 82 TAQA 0.066 0.057 0.123 
83 ARM 0.383 83 Oil Search 0.026 0.088 0.114 
84 Shanxi Coal 0.376 84 Oil India 0.062 0.051 0.113 
85 Capital Power 0.367 85 ARC Resources  0.046 0.066 0.112 
86 PTT 0.359 86 Genel Energy  0.107 0.000 0.107 
87 Shanxi Lanhua Sci-Tech 0.338 87 Canadian Oil Sands  0.102 0.000 0.102 
88 Fortune 0.328 88 Energy XXI 0.076 0.020 0.096 
89 Cardero 0.323 89 PDC Energy 0.055 0.040 0.095 
90 Zhengzhou Coal 0.319 90 Oasis Petroleum  0.084 0.010 0.094 
91 SAIL 0.307 91 Tourmaline Oil  0.014 0.079 0.093 
92 JSPL 0.301 92 Rosetta Resources 0.056 0.037 0.093 
93 Shougang Fushan 0.299 93 RWE  0.030 0.063 0.093 
94 Jingyuan 0.297 94 National Fuel Gas 0.018 0.071 0.088 
95 Stanmore 0.287 95 Peyto E&D  0.008 0.079 0.088 
96 Prophecy Coal 0.272 96 Xcite Energy  0.086 0.001 0.088 
97 Cliffs Natural Resources 0.247 97 Tullow Oil 0.077 0.010 0.087 
98 James River 0.195 98 Energi Mega Persada  0.016 0.069 0.085 
99 CESC 0.185 99 Breitburn Energy Partners 0.053 0.028 0.081 
100 Alcoa 0.180 100 Enerplus  0.043 0.037 0.080 
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Appendix 6 
 
Exhibit 6.1- Colleges and Universities that have committed to fossil fuel divestment 
Sl. Colleges and Universities 
1 College of the Atlantic, ME, USA 
2 Foothill-De Anza Community College Foundation, CA, USA  
3 University of Glasgow, United Kingdom 
4 University of Bedfordshire, United Kingdom 
5 Green Mountain College, VT, USA 
6 Hampshire College, MA, USA 
7 Naropa University, CO, USA 
8 Peralta Community College District, CA, USA 
9 Pitzer College, CA, USA 
10 Prescott College, AZ, USA 
11 San Francisco State University Foundation, CA, USA 
12 Stanford University, CA, USA 
13 Sterling College, VT, USA 
14 Unity College, ME, USA 
15 University of Dayton, OH, USA 
16 Humboldt State University, CA, USA 
17 Victoria University, Wellington, NZ 
18 Chico State University, California, USA 
19 College of Marshall Islands, Marshall Islands 
20 Goddard College, Vermont, USA 
21 Chalmers University of Technology, Göteborg, Sweden 
22 California Institute of the Arts, Valencia, California 
23 University Of Maine System, Maine, USA 
24 The New School, NY, USA 
25 Pacific School of Religion, CA, USA 
26 Brevard College, NC, USA 
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Appendix 7 
Drawbacks of Fossil Fuel Divestment 
This research group acknowledges drawbacks that exist and the limitations that will result by 
implementing divestment action, however overall the gains are much more promising and strengthens 
the social, ethical and economic credibility of the University. These drawbacks are listed below as 
arguments with counter arguments;  
The Clark endowment is not a tool to push political and social agendas; however, the university risks 
being seen as supporting a destructive industry. 
Clark will have lower flexibility in investment choices and options; however, emergent ESG/SRI portfolios 
offer previously unavailable investment opportunities.   
Fossil fuel divestment will have additional transaction costs; however, loss risks far outweigh potential 
transaction costs. 
The timing of asset sales may result in significant losses; however, we do not suggest immediate 
divestment, but a strategic phased approach. 
Divesting from fossil fuels sets a precedent for arguments against other controversial industries; 
however, the preceding analysis is based on shifting economic landscape, not moral controversy. 
Fossil fuel divestment may lead to increased scrutiny of investment practices and institutional policies; 
however, where there are not reasonable alternatives, Clark does not risk being misaligned with 
institutional values (i.e. lack of operational alternatives for electricity consumption. 
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1. Introduction  
 The discussion around fossil fuel divestment has grown in the past few years as a 
response to our most urgent environmental challenge: climate change. Climate change has 
important implications for our environment, our economy, and our population. Divestment has 
become a viable—and potentially crucial—investment strategy. The financial divestment 
movement grew out of the sustainable and responsible investment (SRI) movement. SRI has 
always been a combination of exclusionary divestment and active investment. From religious 
value investing that avoids the sin industries, e.g. tobacco, firearms, and gambling, to present day 
fossil fuel divestment, SRI has always been a divestment from some sector, industry, or company 
(Scholtens, 2014). SRI’s popularity surged through the 1970’s, 1980’s, and 1990’s due to its 
divestment from companies that produced the Vietnam War’s napalm supply and companies that 
supported apartheid in South Africa (Berry, 2013). While these examples used divestment to 
cause a change, they were also a sound financial strategy. For instance, if consumers had begun 
boycotting goods or services provided by companies that operated in apartheid in South Africa, 
then divestment from those companies would be a logical financial decision to decrease risk and 
exposure. Moreover, these companies’ “brands” would have been devalued and investors would 
react accordingly, cutting investments. Since the emergence of climate change as the most urgent 
environmental issue, divestment has been viewed as a potential and partial response. However, 
as with South African apartheid divestment, the argument for fossil fuel divestment goes beyond 
the moral or socially just argument. Divestment is currently a financially profitable and 
economically secure investment strategy.  
 In order to assess the potential financial feasibility of fossil fuel divestment, this report 
will examine previous literature’s analysis of SRI vehicles’ performance prior to the 2008 
financial crisis and recession. In many of these analyses, divestment strategies were pursued by 
SRI funds. Additionally, many of these SRI funds and indexes have at least semi-divested fossil 
fuel holdings, meaning that either these funds have lower exposure than non-SRI mutual funds or 
have divested from certain types of fossil fuels (van Renssen, 2014). Subsequently, an analysis 
of fossil fuel-divested mutual funds’ performance and risk in lieu of the 2008 recession and its 
aftermath will demonstrate the effects of the growing divestment movement and the strength of 
divested portfolios. Nevertheless, investments are about the future, not the past. While past 
performance plays a role in analyzing future investment, a business’s future performance is 
better measured by examining its internal investments and growth potential along with future 
market conditions. Thus, this report will examine the fossil fuel sector’s supply and demand as 
well as fossil fuel-based firms’ internal investment and potential exposure. Divested portfolios’ 
past performance and fossil fuel companies’ risky future outlook could tip divestment to become 
a leading strategy for mitigating and adapting to climate change.  
  
2. Literature and Historical Review 
 Many researchers and investors have examined the performance and risk of SRIs over the 
time period spanning the 1990’s and early-to-mid 2000’s. The results of these analyses are mixed 
with conclusions showing market-exceeding returns, market-equivalent returns, and below-
market returns. In many cases, the timeframe of study, number of firms surveyed, benchmarks, 
and metrics were different and difficult to compare. These differences ultimately play a role in 
each study’s outcome. Nevertheless, understanding the financial position and history of SRI 
vehicles entering the 2008 recession will aid in a better understanding of the financial context in 
which the fossil fuel divestment movement emerged.  
 An examination of European sustainability indexes between 1998 and 2004 showed that 4 of the 
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6 sustainability indexes outperformed the benchmark indexes (Vermeir et al., 2005). This timeframe, 
spanning the 2000 to 2003 economic slowdown, highlights SRI’s lower susceptibility to market 
downturns and more conservative nature. Further evidence can be found in Schueth’s 2003 study of US 
mutual funds from 2000 to 2002 wherein which he remarked, “…investors need not sacrifice performance 
when investing in a socially responsible manner. Investors no longer need to separate good fortune from 
good will” (Schueth, 2003). His analysis found that 64% of the 53 SRI mutual funds examined received 
top rankings from at least one of the independent analysis and review organizations, Lipper and 
Morningstar (Schueth, 2003). Comparatively, only about 40% of the total mutual fund market warrants a 
top rank from Lipper, and only about 32% of the mutual fund market earns a top rank from Morningstar 
(Schueth, 2003). These two studies show SRI mutual funds performing above the market during an 
economic downturn, illustrating that SRIs have lower risk and higher returns during these periods.  
 However, some research has found SRIs to perform below benchmark standards. The results of a 
performance study of 89 Australian SRI funds between 1986 and 2005 found that the market was 
outperforming investments constrained by social, environmental, and ethical criteria (Jones et al., 2008). 
However, during the study period, the Australian stock market (ASX) outperformed many of the major 
international indexes, including the FTSE 100, S&P 500, and several Asian markets. A majority of this 
performance was driven by the energy sector’s reaction to high oil prices (Jones et al., 2008). Thus, SRI 
funds with significant international exposure or little to no energy sector holdings underperformed 
compared to the ASX (Jones et al., 2008). This scenario is a common theme throughout SRI and fossil 
fuel divestment strategy. High oil prices generally signal strong performance for the energy sector, and 
thus, slight underperformance for divested funds compared against market benchmarks (van Renssen, 
2014). The oil price-returns dichotomy and its implications on future fossil fuel investment will be 
discussed in more detail later. 
 In addition to the positive and negative research conclusions regarding SRIs past performance, a 
large share of the research has found SRI fund performance comparable to market benchmarks. A study 
of more than 50 academic papers examining French SRI fund performance from 2004-2007 found that the 
majority of these papers’ results demonstrated that SRI fund performance is not significantly different 
relative to a benchmark indexes (Capelle‐Blancard and Monjon, 2012). The period studied falls during 
France’s economic response to the early-2000’s recession. From 2004-2007, France’s economy 
(measured by GDP) grew by about 20% with SRI funds following the market trend (Trading Economics, 
2014). This study suggests that SRI funds can compete with the market during periods of sustained 
growth. Moreover, another review of 16 SRI fund performance studies with research spanning multiple 
countries and decades (1981-2003) found that in 14 of 16 studies, SRI strategies did not have a significant 
impact on fund performance (Renneboog et al., 2008). Similar to the results of the French review, as the 
world economy more than tripled between 1981 and 2003, the SRI’s performance followed along with 
this economic growth (International Monetary Fund, 2014). Thus, overall the differences in performance 
and risk between SRI funds and market benchmarks appears be insignificant in the lead up to the 2008 
financial crisis. The previously discussed literature has shown SRI funds can be less risky investments 
during economic downturns and equally robust in periods of growth.   
 
 
3. Analysis of Fossil Fuel Divested Mutual Funds (FFDMF) 
 
A. Methods 
In order to assess how FFDMFs reacted to market conditions during and following the 2008 
financial crisis, one must examine these funds in terms of returns and risks as well as in relation to market 
benchmarks. A FFDMF is one that does not hold any companies that extract or process fossil fuels. A SRI 
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firm operates each fund to which SRI principles and strategies are applied. However, specific investment 
strategies and environmental, social, and governance (ESG) criteria may differ. This study concentrates 
on funds with majority equity exposure in order to compare invest vehicles with and without fossil fuel 
holdings. The S&P 500 is a leading indicator of US equities and reflects the risk and return characteristics 
of large-capitalization companies (S&P Dow Jones Indices, 2014). Its value is the average stock price of 
its holdings weighted by size (S&P Dow Jones Indices, 2014). As would be expected, in the market, 
companies are not of equal size and do not have equal influence on the market. This analysis also 
employs the Dow Jones Sustainability US Composite Index (AASGI) in order to compare SRI investment 
vehicles with and without fossil fuel exposure. The Oil and Gas sector make up about 17% of AASGI 
with Exxon Mobil and Chevron accounting for more than 10% of the index (S&P Dow Jones Indices and 
RobecoSAM, 2014). The index is composed of US sustainability leaders, the top 20% of the Dow Jones 
Sustainability North American Index, as identified through a sustainability assessment (S&P Dow Jones 
Indices and RobecoSAM, 2014). As with the S&P 500, its holdings are weighed by market capitalization 
(S&P Dow Jones Indices and RobecoSAM, 2014). US-based benchmarks have been employed because 
about 75% of the total equities held by this portfolio are US equities.  
The portfolio of FFDMFs includes seven different mutual funds from five different capital 
management firms. In order to understand some of the funds’ basic characteristics, this study employed 
the Morningstar Style Box’s definitions. The Style Box defines three size categories (small, mid, and 
large capitalization) and three style categories (value, growth, and blend). In order to determine the style, 
Morningstar compares the growth and value characteristics for each of the funds’ stocks to ones with 
similar capitalization and then scores them on a 100-point scale. The resulting stock’s number is classified 
as growth or value depending on certain thresholds. Morningstar uses a flexible system to determine 
capitalization. Capitalization is defined by the portion of the market that a stock represents (large: top 
70% of the market; mid: middle 20%; and small: bottom 10%). Equity funds are the aggregation of their 
holdings1. All but two of the funds are large cap, and only one is blended fund. Moreover, only one of the 
funds is not a balanced fund with some green bond exposure. For more information about fund 
characteristics, see Figure 1 below.  
Investors use standard deviation (SD) to measure and assess fund risk, and the percent change 
between 7/1/2007 and 7/1/2014 is used to measure fund performance. SD measures an investment's 
volatility and helps gauge an investment’s expected volatility and risk (Maginn et al., 2007). Using 
Morningstar’s analysis of the past 10-year and 5-year periods’ SD, an average 7.5-year SD was calculated 
and used for comparison. In the event that average risk is incalculable due to unavailable data, the 5-year 
average was used for the overall average. This analysis uses a start date about six months prior to the start 
of the 2008 recession because the aim is to analyze the reaction and response of these funds to the 
financial crisis. A chart analysis of this fossil fuel free portfolio (“the Portfolio”) and its benchmark will 
allow investors to better understand how fossil fuel divested portfolios act over different investment 
climates. Thus, in order to assess the returns for an investor from these FFDMFs, this analysis uses the 
change in the funds’ price over time. This analysis will employ a return to risk ratio in order to determine 
the amount of return per unit of risk. These figures have been calculated using equal weighting across 
each of the funds.  
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The Portfolio’s Mutual Funds’ Characteristics35 
 
 
Mutual Funds  
Morningstar 
Style 
Fund Type (% 
equities) 
Green Century (GC) Balanced Fund  Large Growth Balanced (68) 
GC Equity Fund Large Blend Equity (99) 
Parnassus Endeavor Fund  Large Growth Equity (89) 
Pax World (PW) Growth Fund Large Growth Equity (97) 
Portfolio 21 Global Equity Fund Large Growth Equity (98) 
Shelton Green Alpha Fund Mid Growth Equity (100) 
PW Global Environmental Markets Fund Mid Growth Equity (100) 
 
Fig. 1 – A list of the Portfolio’s funds and their characteristics in regard to style and type 
 
 
B. Results36  
 
 The Portfolio increased by 37.61% since 7/1/07, almost 12% higher than the S&P 500 and 77% 
higher than the AAGSI over the same time period (p-value = .57 and .05, respectively). The Portfolio’s 
constituents had a wide range (STDEV: 52.8) of performance outcomes in relation to the S&P 500; 
Portfolio 21 Global Equity Fund (PORTX) finished the 7-year period at about 58% less than the S&P 
500, while the Parnassus Endeavor Fund (PARWX) outperformed the S&P 500 by over 94%. In terms of 
risk, the Portfolio (14.09) was slightly riskier than the S&P 500 (13.94). The difference in risk between 
the S&P 500 and the Portfolio is not statistically significant (p-value = .85). In order to assess the returns 
and risk together, this analysis employs a Returns-Risk ratio (R/R). This ratio allows investors to 
understand the growth of an investment while holding risk equal. As would be expected, the Portfolio’s 
R/R ratio (2.67) was about 11% higher than the S&P 500’s R/R ratio (2.41). Thus, seeing as risk is about 
equal, the Portfolio has outperformed its benchmark, the S&P 500. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
35 Information found on Morningstar.com  
36 Note: Results employ data spanning an unusual and anomalistic period of economic recession due to rapid 
changes in the US housing market. This unusual economic event has the potential to skew data.   
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The Portfolio’s Performance and Risk37 
 
 
Performance (as of 
7/5/14) 
Risk (STDEV)  
Mutual Funds  
% Δ in 
price from 
7/1/07* 
% Diff. 
from 
.INX 
10 yr. 5 yr. Avg. 
% Diff. 
from .INX 
Return/
Risk 
Ratio 
GC Balanced 34.03 1.25 11.09 9.42 10.26 -26.43 3.32 
Green Century (GC) Equity  33.95 1.01 12.88 14.45 13.67 -1.97 2.48 
Parnassus Endeavor  65.29 94.26 - 14.89 14.89 6.81 4.38 
Pax World (PW) Growth  31.25 -7.02 16.84 14.89 15.87 13.81 1.97 
Portfolio 21 Global Equity 14.02 -58.29 15.63 13.94 14.79 6.06 0.95 
Shelton Green Alpha 62.02 84.53 - - 17.16 23.10 3.61 
PW Global Env. Mrkts 22.73 -32.37 - 16.14 16.14 15.78 1.41 
Portfolio Totals  37.61 11.91 14.23 13.96 14.09 1.08 2.67 
        
S&P 500 33.61 N/A 14.69 13.19 13.94 N/A 2.41 
Vanguard Energy Index 38.32 14.01 - 19.32 19.32 38.59 1.98 
Dow Jones Sustainability 
US Composite Index 
21.23 -36.83 - - - - - 
*or inception        
Fig. 2 – Performance and risk results of the Portfolio, its mutual funds, S&P 500, and VGENX 
 
C. Chart Analysis38 
(1) Performance 
 While the Portfolio outperformed its benchmark over the 7-year period studied, it is useful to 
examine the Portfolio’s funds’ performance during to the late 2000’s recession and the funds’ response as 
the economy turned around in the following years. At the deepest part of the recession in early 2009, the 
S&P 500 had lost just over 51% of its value (since this study’s start date); meanwhile, only two of the six 
active funds in the Portfolio had lost higher percentages of their value over the same time period. The 
                                                          
37 Historic values and data from Google Finance (google.com/finance) and Morningstar (Morningstar.com) 
38 Using Google Finance’s comparative chart analysis tool 
(https://www.google.com/finance?chdnp=1&chfdeh=0&chdet=1405627200000&chddm=702576&cmpto=INDEXSP:.INX;MUTF:GCEQX;MU
TF:GCBLX;MUTF:PARWX;MUTF:PXWGX;MUTF:PORTX;MUTF:NEXTX;MUTF:PGRNX&cmptdms=0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0&q=INDEXSP:.INX,
MUTF:GCEQX,MUTF:GCBLX,MUTF:PARWX,MUTF:PXWGX,MUTF:PORTX,MUTF:NEXTX,MUTF:PGRNX&ntsp=0&ei=0gRAVKioCt
LhqAH894DICw) 
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S&P 500 recovered faster to its pre-recession value than three of the funds. The Green Century Balanced 
Fund (GCBLX), PARWX, and the Pax World Growth Fund (PXWGX) all recovered faster than the S&P 
500. The GCBLX and PARWX are the most balanced funds in the Portfolio, investing in some bonds. 
Lower equity exposure (68% exposure for GCBLX and 89% exposure for PARWX) could be partially 
responsible for the higher resilience to a domestic and global recession. GCBLX and PARWX also only 
lost 37.46% and 45.27%, respectively, of their initial value at the deepest part of the recession compared 
to the S&P 500’s 51.07%. The other fund with a market-beating response to the recession, PARWX, 
exploded after reaching a low point, realizing its initial value by mid-2011. GCBLX did not reach this 
point until Q4 of 2012, while the remaining funds and the S&P 500 did not permanently break even until 
mid-2013. These results show that a balanced portfolio can help protect against recessional losses. 
However, FFDMFs do not appear to be more or less susceptible to economy-wide recessions compared to 
other equities.  
 Since the recession’s low point in early 2009, the S&P 500 has grown by 162.44%. Only the 
Green Century Equity Fund (GCEQX) (162%), PARWX (163.65%), and PXWGX (171.03%) have 
grown by amounts similar to the S&P 500. However, the Portfolio’s other funds underperformed the S&P 
500 since the low point of the recession. These results illustrate that FFDMFs can outperform, 
underperform, and follow the market. Overall, the Portfolio’s response was relatively equal to its 
benchmark and the economy as a whole. Excluding the Pax World Global Environmental Markets Fund’s 
(PGRNX) 2014 stagnation, the funds have generally followed the market. With an equally weighted 
portfolio, the increase in performance of the Portfolio over the S&P 500 can be partially attributed to 
results of PARWX outperforming the benchmark more than PROTX’s underperformance of the 
benchmark.  
 
(2) Risk 
 While the average, equal-weighted risk of the Portfolio was almost equal to the S&P 500’s risk 
over the same time period, the distribution suggests that FFDMFs may be slightly riskier than the market 
average. In the Portfolio, five of the seven funds had standard deviations higher than the S&P 500’s 
standard deviation. Nonetheless, all of the Portfolio’s funds are at least 11% less risky than the energy 
sector, measured by the Vanguard Energy Fund, or VGENX (p-value < .001). The VGENX has exposure 
to fossil fuel industry through extractors, producers, and refiners of oil, natural gas, and coal (Vanguard 
Group, 2014). Logically, risk should increase as diversification decreases. Because FFDMFs are 
inherently less diverse than the market, risk is expected to be slightly higher, as observed with most of the 
funds in the Portfolio. However, the Portfolio as a whole has shown that divestment does not significantly 
increase risk over the studied period. 
 
(3) R/R Ratio 
 With no significant difference between the S&P 500’s and the Portfolio’s risk, the R/R Ratio 
demonstrates that the Portfolio is producing higher returns for the same level of risk. For every unit of 
risk, the Portfolio is outperforming the S&P 500 and the energy sector. While the energy sector has 
outperformed the benchmark and the Portfolio, the energy sector’s higher risk pulls down their R/R ratio. 
The Portfolio’s funds had a wide distribution of R/R ratios with four funds above the market average and 
three funds below the market average. Overall, the Portfolio’s higher R/R ratio illustrates a divested 
portfolio’s capability to best the market in terms of risk-adjusted returns.  
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4. The Carbon Future 
 While past performance can help inform decisions about investments, investing is about the 
future. Examining the fossil fuel industry and the energy sector’s future will allow investors to understand 
the potential downfalls. A carbon bubble may exist around potential regulation and the climate crisis. 
Moreover, the interaction between fossil fuels’ supply and demand, the energy sector’s capital 
expenditure, and pricing has the potential to produce adverse investment conditions. A bleak forecast for 
the fossil fuel industry will lead investors to divest from fossil fuel companies.  
 
A. Carbon Math 
 Bill McKibben’s new math, along with contributions from the IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change) and the EIA (Energy Information Administration), has led to a new outlook on the 
world’s carbon budget in relation to climate change. According to the 2013 IPCC’s climate change report, 
there is a 95% to 100% probability that anthropomorphic activities are partly responsible for rising global 
temperatures as a result of greenhouse gasses (GHG) emissions (Stocker et al., 2013). About 60% of the 
world’s countries signed the 2009 Copenhagen Accord, agreeing that global increase in temperature 
above 2°C will bring dangerous risks for the future of civilization (Copenhagen Accord, 2009, McKibben, 
2012). The IPCC report continues by stating that in order to have a 50% probability, holding rising 
temperatures to at or below 2°C, civilization must limit CO2 concentrations in the atmosphere to 450 parts 
per million (ppm) (Stocker et al., 2013). In order to remain below 450 ppm, scientists estimate that 
humans can only pump about 565 more gigatons (Gt) of CO2 into the atmosphere by 2050 (McKibben, 
2012). Unfortunately, the Carbon Tracker Initiative (CTI) estimated in 2012 that private fossil fuel 
companies as well as nationalized fossil fuels’ reserves are over 5 times as high as the 565-Gt carbon 
budget (Carbon Tracker Initiative, 2014a, McKibben, 2012). The discrepancy of these numbers creates 
potential risk for fossil fuel companies, investors, partners, and the world economy as a whole. The 
application of this carbon budget would result in a substantial amount of stranded assets, due to a 
significant loss in value of carbon assets before their anticipated use (Generation Foundation, 2013). 
Enforcement of the carbon budget could occur in one of two forms: government regulation or private-
social forces (Generation Foundation, 2013). In the first scenario, government regulation, assets could 
become stranded if authorities create a direct cap on carbon emission or indirectly regulate through 
mandates on renewable energy adoption and efficiency standards (Generation Foundation, 2013).  Even 
the threat of regulation creates uncertainty for long-lived carbon-intensive assets. In this second scenario, 
stranded carbon assets could result from market forces, such as economically-competitive renewable 
technologies, or social pressures; business always aims to reduce costs and increase efficiency, which 
would include using less and less energy (Generation Foundation, 2013). Similarly, social pressures could 
create a scenario in which carbon-intensive businesses’ reputations and brand become devalued by 
consumers and demand for fossil fuels decline (Generation Foundation, 2013). Currently, the atmospheric 
CO2 concentrations are at 395.3 ppm and have been increasing over the last decade by about 2 ppm per 
year39. Continuing along the current trajectory over the next 35 years will leave the globe well beyond 
450 ppm. As the world closes in on an atmospheric CO2 concentration of 450 ppm, the urgency and 
necessity for action will become increasingly apparent. In order to avoid these long-term risks and 
exposure to this bubble, investors should seek fossil fuel divestment strategies. Because investors seek 
capital appreciation over the long term, investments should be aimed at areas of potential growth, not 
devaluation.  
 
                                                          
39 As of 10/27/14, data from CO2Now.org 
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B. The Cost of Carbon  
 In addition to the external influences on the fossil fuel sector mentioned above, a closer 
examination of fossil fuel companies’ operations, investments, and ventures reveals some important 
information about the potential direction of these companies. Fossil fuel companies have grown 
tremendously over the previous half-century, but recent changes in their business landscape have the 
potential to create devastating consequences for their future cash flows. CTI has done extensive research 
into the oil industry and the key role it will play in the energy sector’s future. The oil industry accounts 
for about 40% of the globe’s total carbon reserves; unlike the emerging natural gas industry or the 
declining coal industry, the oil industry exists in a mature state in the midst of a transition from 
conventional energy resources to unconventional resources (Carbon Tracker Initiative, 2014a). Before the 
turn of the century, the oil industry’s profits had been based on the extraction and processing of 
conventional, underground or shallow offshore oil fields (Carbon Tracker Initiative, 2014a). This 
relatively inexpensive method of exploitation created huge profits, market-beating returns, and an 
opportunity to energize investors with dividends and to reinvest in future growth (Hodel and Deitz, 1994). 
However, the decline in conventional oil reserves has forced the oil industry to explore other, more 
unconventional approaches and methods to locating, extracting, processing, and delivering oil to their 
customers and consumers.  
 Presently, the oil industry is transitioning away from conventional oil resources and 
exploring unconventional oil resources, such as ultra-deepwater, shale oil, oil sands, and extra 
heavy oil (Carbon Tracker Initiative, 2014a). The major issue with these unconventional reserves 
is the cost of developing them. According to CTI, “worldwide capital expenditures (capex) 
related to oil and gas production increased from $250 billion in 2000 to nearly $700 billion in 
2013 (both figures in 2012 US dollars)” (Carbon Tracker Initiative, 2014b). Capex is the amount 
of money spent on acquisitions or upgrades of physical assets such as the discovery, purchase, 
and development of oil reserves (Pogue, 2010). As conventional oil reserves are reaching 
exhaustion and new, high-cost unconventional oil reserves are required to sustain the global oil 
supply, the oil industry has been forced to invest more and more capital for a similar level of 
production (see Figure 3 in Appendix A). Since 2005, about 88% of the increase in net global oil 
production has been the result of unconventional resources (Carbon Tracker Initiative, 2014b). 
However, the increase of this investment has resulted in significantly smaller increases in the 
global oil supply (Carbon Tracker Initiative, 2014b). The eleven largest publicly traded oil 
companies’ capex has quintupled, while cumulative production has remained approximately 
constant over a period between 2000 and 2012 (Carbon Tracker Initiative, 2014b). Barclays 
Investment Bank estimates that the oil industry’s capex per barrel of oil has increased annually 
by about 11% between 1999 and 2013, more than ten times faster than in the previous 14-year 
period (Kopits, 2014). Furthermore, the staggering increase in the oil industry’s capex is 
expected to continue to increase over at least the short-term future and probably in the long term 
(Carbon Tracker Initiative, 2014b). In the US, unconventional oil resources are expected to 
remain the chief source of new oil, keeping capex and capex per barrel on the rise (CTI).  
 The increase in capex and capex intensity has important implications for shareholders and 
investors. First, expected returns from these future projects have fallen to around the oil 
industry’s long-term hurdle rate of 12% to 13% (Carbon Tracker Initiative, 2014b). The hurdle 
rate is the minimum rate of return on the capex investments required by an oil companies’ 
management to compensate for risk (Pogue, 2010). The oil industry’s average rate of return on 
future projects has decreased from about 21% in 2008 to about 12% in 2013 (Carbon Tracker 
Initiative, 2014b). Because upstream returns account for approximately 75% of earnings, an oil 
company’s returns generally mirror upstream returns (Carbon Tracker Initiative, 2014b). 
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According to Citi’s analysis of oil industry’s cash returns, returns have dropped below 11%, the 
oil industry’s 30-year average, meaning future cash generations will most likely be insufficient in 
support of current capex investment and dividends payments (see Figure 6 in Appendix A) 
(Carbon Tracker Initiative, 2014b). This potential cash shortage would force companies to either 
decrease capex or forego dividends. Both options would hurt investors: a decrease in dividends 
would directly take money away from investors, and lower capex would signal lower future oil 
returns. In order to remain cash flow neutral and leave investors unharmed, oil prices will need to 
be high enough to cover this new oil’s higher costs. Goldman Sachs has researched and analyzed 
the breakeven oil prices for oil companies to be cash flow neutral after capex and dividends. 
They estimate that the majority of major oil companies have cash-neutral oil prices of between 
$100 and $120 per barrel (Carbon Tracker Initiative, 2014a). This is an increase from the 
estimated breakeven price of about $80 per barrel from 2008 to 2011 (Carbon Tracker Initiative, 
2014a). Thus, the oil industry’s transition from conventional to unconventional oil resources and 
the accompanying higher costs create risks and uncertainty surrounding these oil companies’ 
future value, earnings, and dividend distributions. 
 Nevertheless, to further examine the oil industry’s future potential to investors, an 
analysis of future oil prices is crucial. For example, booming future oil prices could result in 
extraordinary performance of the oil industry, while lower prices could spell disaster for these 
companies and their investors. According to basic microeconomic theory, in order to operate a 
profitable business or at the very least breakeven, the price of oil must be equal to or higher than 
the total cost of producing the barrel of oil (Mankiw, 2014). While the supply of oil has been 
previously discussed, alterations in demand can also have a significant impact on the global oil 
price and, consequently, oil companies and their investors. While projections of oil demand are 
varied and complex, the IEA (International Energy Agency), CTI, and the oil Majors (BP, 
Chevron, ExxonMobil, Shell, Total, ConocoPhillips, and ENI) have scenarios for the status quo, 
the adoption of new stricter carbon policies, and the carbon budget. In order for the global 
average temperature’s increase to remain below 2°C, the carbon budget must be enforced. This 
scenario assumes a decrease of 1% in the annual growth rate of oil demand, a decrease by 
approximately 9.2 million of barrels per day (MBPD) over about the next 20 years (International 
Energy Agency, 2013). This scenario is vastly different than projections using current carbon 
policies–1% annual growth rate and an increase of 22.6 MBPD demanded–or the average 20-
year demand growth projected by the Majors (e.g. BP, Chevron, ExxonMobil, Shell, Total, 
ConocoPhillips, and ENI), an approximate 19.5 MBPD in demand growth (International Energy 
Agency, 2013). The moderate, new carbon policy scenario assumes that new regulations will 
result in an annual demand growth rate of 0.6% and projects a 14 MBPD increase in oil demand 
(International Energy Agency, 2013). See Figure 4 in Appendix A below.   
 These demand scenarios illustrate the potential risk to oil companies and their assets. The 
BEOP represent the minimum price required to make the capex investment economic, a critical 
indicator for companies’ and investors’ economic risk in relation to future demand scenarios 
(Carbon Tracker Initiative, 2014a). In these scenarios, the BEOP is less than the market oil price 
required for development investment because a $15-per-barrel contingency is added to the BEOP 
to account for risks (Carbon Tracker Initiative, 2014a). Projects with a BEOP at or below $60 per 
barrel represent a level of oil demand under CTI’s oil-specific carbon budget; the Organization 
of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) owns a majority of the oil at this level due to OPEC’s 
mainly low-cost, conventional production sources (Carbon Tracker Initiative, 2014a). Should 
regulation or market forces conspire to enforce the 2°C limit oil-specific carbon budget, the non-
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OPEC oil assets will be most vulnerable. Oil investments contain added risk as the carbon bubble 
looms. The next price band, a BEOP of $60 to $80 per barrel, is the level at which most 
conventional non-OPEC oil production becomes economic; however, in order to reach this price 
and demand, more government regulation and slower Chinese economic growth would be 
required (Carbon Tracker Initiative, 2014a). A BEOP between $80 and $100 per barrel is the 
band of pricing that most oil companies use for planning and project-analysis purposes; this 
range represents projects that would be viable under the current polices demand scenario 
(Carbon Tracker Initiative, 2014a). The profitability of these projects is susceptible to increased 
regulation or regional or global economic slowdown. Higher price bands of BEOP, above $100 
per barrel, will require extremely high demand. A BEOP above $100 per barrel (especially as the 
BEOP nears $150+ per barrel) exceeds most oil companies' planning assumptions and forecasts; 
these projects are even riskier than others in lower bands as these BEOPs are least unlikely to be 
reached (Carbon Tracker Initiative, 2014a).  
 As discussed above, a project’s risk increases as its required BEOP approaches and 
exceeds $100 per barrel. Nevertheless, oil companies continue to spend capex on projects that 
have at the very least minor risk attached with BEOPs above $80 per barrel and extraordinary 
risk at above $150 per barrel (see Figure 5 in Appendix A). Globally, 29% of the projects 
representing the global oil supply will require a BEOP of above $80 per barrel and 12.3% of the 
projects will require a BEOP above $120 per barrel (Carbon Tracker Initiative, 2014a). The 
private oil industry will bear a large portion of this risk with 41% and 21% of private oil projects 
requiring a BEOP above $80 and $120 per barrel, respectively (Carbon Tracker Initiative, 
2014a). For example, one of the economically riskiest projects, the Alberta Canada oil sands 
project, will require 44% of the project’s oil to be produced above a BEOP of $80 per barrel, 
more than for any other unconventional source (Carbon Tracker Initiative, 2014a). 
Unconventional projects create greater risk and potentially lower returns for these oil companies 
and their investors.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 As we have seen throughout this analysis, divestment is an investment strategy that can 
provide at least market-equivalent returns as well as reduce recessional vulnerability and other 
risks. Moreover, recent activity within the fossil fuel industry, especially the oil industry, has 
created some potential risk and areas of concern for prudent investors. Declining capex 
productivity could constrain future cash flows, hurting both company growth and investors. 
Additionally, the approaching carbon bubble’s influence on future demand scenarios could create 
an inhospitable environment for many unconventional fossil fuel projects, leading to stranded 
assets and the devaluation of fossil fuel companies. As an investor, one must examine his or her 
personal fossil fuel holdings. Whether through hedge fund, mutual fund, pension, 401k, or 
another private individual investment, investors should set portfolio-wide thresholds with respect 
to a company’s future demand exposure (Carbon Tracker Initiative, 2014a). In order to better 
access information about risk and evaluate companies, investors must require transparent 
disclosure of the future demand and price scenarios used in capex investment planning (Carbon 
Tracker Initiative, 2014a). Investors should plan to move investments away from riskier fossil 
fuel companies as the planet approaches its carbon budget.  
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Appendix A  
 
 
 
Figure 3  
 
Combined Capex and production data for BG, BP, COP, CVX, ENI, OXY, PBR, RDS, 
STO, TOT, XOM 
 
 
 
 
Source: Carbon Tracker Initiative (2014b) From Capex Growth to Capital Discipline? - Cost, 
Risk, and Return Trends in the Upstream Oil Industry. IN Carbon Tracker Initiative (Ed. 
Online, Energy Transition Advisors  
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Figure 4 
 
EIA’s Oil Demand Scenarios 2014-2035: Current Policies, New Policies Scenario, and 450 
Scenario 
 
 
 
Source: Carbon Tracker Initiative (2014a) Carbon Supply Cost Curves: Evaluating financial risk 
to oil capital expenditures. Online, Energy Transition Advisors. 
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Figure 5 
 
Carbon and Oil Production by company category and BEOP level: 2014-2050 
 
 
Source: Carbon Tracker Initiative (2014a) Carbon Supply Cost Curves: Evaluating financial risk 
to oil capital expenditures. Online, Energy Transition Advisors. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6 
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Oil Price Required to be Cash Flow Neutral after Capex and Dividends by Oil Company 
 
 
 
Source: Carbon Tracker Initiative (2014b) From Capex Growth to Capital Discipline? - Cost, 
Risk, and Return Trends in the Upstream Oil Industry. IN Carbon Tracker Initiative (Ed. 
Online, Energy Transition Advisors  
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Appendix B – Statistical Significance   
 
Figure 7 
 
 
P-value Table 
 
  .INX VGENX AAGSI 
 SD t-stat p-value t-stat p-value t-stat p-value 
Performance - %Δ 17.755 0.596 0.573 0.105 0.920 2.441 0.050 
Performance - Risk 2.082 0.191 0.855 6.645 0.001 NA NA 
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